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CLAUDIA STOKES
In Defense of Genius: Howells and the  
Limits of Literary History
In early 1886, William Dean Howells fell into an ugly public debate with 
the poet and critic Edmund Clarence Stedman. Carried out in the pages 
of Harper’s	Monthly	and the	New	Princeton	Review, this dispute started as a 
disagreement about the origins of literary craftsmanship but quickly esca-
lated into a heated epistemological squabble about the limits of historical 
knowledge. It began in March of that year, when Howells gave a mixed 
review to Stedman’s Poets	of	America	(1885), a history of American poetry. 
Though Howells conceded the importance of Stedman’s contribution to 
the emerging discipline of American literary history, he openly mocked a 
few of Stedman’s claims: his prediction of an American poetry revival and 
his staunch belief in genius, a category of achievement Stedman used with 
great liberality. Stedman was humiliated by Howells’ published remarks, 
and he responded six months later with the essay “Genius,” in which he 
feebly attempted to defend the scholarly claims of Poets	of	America. Though 
the two long-time friends visibly struggled to remain cordial, their strained 
politeness occasionally gave way to underhanded barbs: Howells, for ex-
ample, wryly remarked that genius was merely “the fancy of those who hope 
that someone else will think they have it.”1 This uncharacteristically prickly 
exchange generated so much attention at the time that other periodicals—
among them The	Critic, the Boston	Gazette, and the Penny	Post—published 
articles about it, providing summaries of each man’s arguments while studi-
ously avoiding taking sides. And though the two men soon resumed their 
friendship and collegial rapport, neither was willing to let the matter go 
or concede defeat: Howells reprinted much of his 1886 review in Criticism	
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and	Fiction	(1891) and Stedman continued to restate his own positions for 
the rest of his life.2
 There is more to this public feud than perhaps meets the eye. Though 
their squabble about poetry and genius may seem quaint and old-fashioned 
today, the stakes of this quarrel were high. For the prize each man so fiercely 
sought was controlling influence over the aesthetics and practices of literary 
history, a genre that was still so new to the United States that its methods 
remained unfixed and amenable to influence.3 Indeed, Howells’ chief ob-
jection to Stedman’s Poets	of	America was his transparent use of literary his-
tory to consolidate and promote his own generic and aesthetic allegiances. 
Howells countered not by suggesting that literary history remain unbiased 
by such obvious literary partisanship but by suggesting that his own literary 
values—diligence, positivism, and the belief in historical determinacy—
would serve as better organizing rubrics. As this essay will show, Howells 
more successfully argued his case and characterized Stedman’s methods 
as slipshod, superstitious, and unsuited to serious scholarship. This 1886 
exchange tipped the scales in favor of the methods Howells recommended, 
and the literary history produced in its aftermath is characterized by a firm 
confidence in the evidentiary powers of data and the expository, narra-
tive form that Howells endorsed, despite Stedman’s skepticism about the 
intellectual restrictions of both. The Howells-Stedman feud also warrants 
our attention because it exposes the aesthetic character of these seemingly 
neutral methodologies, which have been in place for over a century.
 Though Stedman has long been forgotten by American readers and liter-
ary scholars alike, he was Howells’ peer and counterpart in the literary late 
century. Both men launched their careers as poets in the 1860s, and, though 
Howells later switched from poetry to narrative fiction, Stedman became the 
preeminent poet and poetry critic of the era. By the 1870s, just as literary 
histories started to proliferate amid the centennial celebrations, Stedman 
began writing literary histories, and Poets	of	America, his first foray into Ameri-
can literary history, was conceived as an American complement to his highly 
successful Victorian	Poets (1875), a study of nineteenth-century British poets. 
By the end of the century, Stedman’s literary output was limited exclusively 
to criticism and literary history, as with his work editing numerous literary 
anthologies such as the Victorian	Anthology	(1895) and the American	Anthol-
ogy (1900). Howells was similarly interested in literary history, and he kept 
up with developments in the field by reviewing countless literary histories 
in his Harper’s columns. Like Stedman, his interest led him to try his hand 
at the genre, as with his Heroines	of	Fiction (1901), an ambitious two-volume 
history of female characters in the Anglo-American novel. His enthusiasm 
for literary history was such that he was known to send drafts of his essays 
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to literary historians for fact-checking, and he personally urged playwright 
and critic Brander Matthews to write a literary history for schoolchildren, 
an endeavor that became Matthews’ enormously successful textbook, An	
Introduction	to	the	Study	of	American	Literature (1896).
 This shared enthusiasm for literary history was undercut by the widening 
chasm of aesthetics separating the two men, for their dissimilar sensibili-
ties bred equally dissimilar ideas about what literary history could achieve 
and claim. Howells’ role as promoter and codifier of realism hardly needs 
rehearsing, as he tirelessly advanced a literary aesthetic he characterized 
by the faithful, appreciative documentation of ordinary life, which he de-
scribed as the “simple, the natural, and the honest.”4 Stedman, on the other 
hand, was a known adherent of idealism, an aesthetic often constituted as 
realism’s foil in late-century aesthetics. Idealism disputed the quotidian 
interests of realism and argued that, instead of reifying American life, lit-
erature should depict an idealized world that would refine and inspire it. 
Idealism likewise took exception to the realist focus on the minutiae of daily 
life and claimed that such a restricted concentration on empirical data was 
insufficient for a fully realistic portrait of life. Stedman instead encouraged 
supplementing such data with the use of imagination and intuition, for 
without them, he claimed, realist writings were merely “stiff, barren, and 
grotesque,—the form without the soul. They deal with the minor facts of 
art, unable to compass the major.”5 According to Stedman, such imagina-
tive flights imbued a vitality to texts that could not be otherwise achieved 
through the mere recitation of data and empirical research. “True Realism,” 
Stedman argued, “is just as faithful to the ideal and to the soul of things as 
to obvious and external matters.”6
 Inherent in these competing aesthetics are profoundly different views of 
determinacy and the evidentiary value of data. For the idealist Stedman, 
empirical data was at best partial and merely hinted at philosophical or 
experiential truths lacking a material expression. The full truth, whether 
of the past or the present, was inaccessible by way of archival fact-gathering 
alone and remained permanently uncertain, even if supplemented by intu-
ition and imagination, as Stedman recommended. On the other hand, such 
data occupies a central role in Howellsian realism and its efforts to docu-
ment the authentic textures of everyday life. For Howells, material objects 
and physical details provide invaluable insight into a knowable world; inner 
lives in Howellsian realism do have a material expression, and one need only 
observe the contents of a parlor or the color of an evening gown to gain 
access to a person’s interiority.7 These different views certainly produced 
widely divergent literary texts, but Stedman and Howells also brought them 
to bear on literary history. Stedman’s willingness to step outside the bounds 
stokes  Essays
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of data collection is visible throughout Poets	of	America, which is studded with 
moments of speculation and fancifulness. For example, in his chapter on 
William Cullen Bryant, Stedman used Bryant’s patriotic poems as a point 
of departure for an imaginative flight of fancy: he wrote, “The country is 
the open wild of liberty. All our poets of nature are poets of human rights. 
Should America ever become monarchical it will be due to the influence 
of cities and those bred in them.”8 The implicit idealist aesthetics of this 
passage are visible in its unconflicted imaginative conjecture and in its 
departure from the confines of verifiable data.
 Howells flatly denounced these idealist traits in Stedman’s volume to sug-
gest that the book’s imaginative departures from the terra firma of verifiable, 
researched data had made it error-ridden and too flaky to be considered a 
serious work of scholarship, an assessment underwritten by Howells’ own 
realist sympathies. By way of proof, Howells spent most of his review exposing 
some of Stedman’s more controversial assertions, among them his claim that 
Howells had abandoned poetry not for aesthetic reasons but for financial 
ones, anticipating that fiction would prove more “remunerative.”9 Similarly, 
Howells took aim at Stedman’s prediction of a poetry revival, a contention 
that Howells depicted as equally baseless in light of poetry’s waning impor-
tance in contemporary literary culture; he remarked with sang-froid, “if we 
are at the end of our great poets for the present, we do not know that we 
shall altogether despair.”10 In discrediting several of Stedman’s facts, Howells 
demonstrates how intuitive supposition and the dismissal of factual corrobo-
ration had only compromised the book’s integrity and factual reliability. But 
the vestige of Stedman’s idealism that elicited Howells’ most stringent com-
mentary was his avid promotion of genius, a term Stedman used to describe 
over a half dozen American writers in Poets	of	America.	Howells unflinchingly 
attacked one of idealism’s core beliefs with his declaration that “[t]here is 
no ‘genius’; there is only the mastery that comes to natural aptitude from 
the hardest study of any art or science.”11 In the tense flurry of publications 
about genius that ensued, discussion returned repeatedly to the epistemo-
logical problem of determinacy and the merits of data that underlay their 
aesthetic rift. Their warring claims about the limits of knowledge replayed 
the idealist/realist rivalry so that, for Stedman, genius typified the idealist 
belief in the finitude of human knowledge whereas genius for Howells dem-
onstrated the necessity of empiricist research rooted in verifiable facts.
 Genius emerges in Stedman’s writings less as the zenith of human achieve-
ment than as the ultimate literary historical mystery, the talent that defies 
contextualization and whose sources remain inexplicable. As with his remark 
in the essay “Genius” that the genius “knows without learning, and teaches 
the world what he has never learned,” he constituted the genius as one whose 
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works are recognized by their departure from contemporaneous practice 
and resistance to historicization.12 For example, in his discussion of Edgar 
Allan Poe in Poets	of	America, Stedman fails to find Poe’s creative sources: 
Poe “was, after all, a man of like passions with ourselves. . . . Thousands have 
gone as far toward both [temperamental] extremes, and the world has never 
heard of them.”13 Without a logical explanation to turn to, Stedman throws 
up his hands at the literary historical enterprise and dubs him a genius: 
Poe, he wrote, “must have had genius to furnish the basis” for his work.14 
Similarly, in his discussion of Whitman in Poets	of	America, Stedman suggests 
that traditional evaluative criteria are simply insufficient, for “[t]o judge him 
in conformity with these ideas lessens our estimate of his genius. Genius is 
greatly consistent when most audacious.”15 Genius comes into view for Sted-
man with the failures of conventional sources of historical explanation such 
as archival fact-gathering. Thus genius both legitimizes the idealist belief in 
the limitations of empiricism and emerges as the ultimate practitioner of 
idealist methods. As Stedman remarked in the essay “Genius,” composed 
in response to Howells, the genius can be recognized by his or her innate 
idealist tendencies: “it is the privilege of genius to see the soul of things; 
not merely their externals, but to know, to feel, the secret meaning of all 
that makes up life,” an ability he termed an “ideal tendency.”16 As Stedman 
classified it, the genius is unbound by the precincts of materiality and is able 
to see past the commonplace to arrive at new but no less truthful ways of 
looking at the world.
 Stedman’s portrait of genius imported to the United States a debate that 
had already proved volatile among European literary historians. The ori-
gins of the Western belief in genius derive from antiquity, when, according 
to Penelope Murray, genius was understood as the divine entity or muse 
responsible for the production of poetry.17 The poet was extraordinary in 
part because of the readiness with which such divine influence could be 
discerned, and poetry in such a setting was construed as the visible product 
and evidence of divine intervention that, though believed to be widespread, 
was less noticeable elsewhere. The designation of the genius as someone 
able to heighten or illuminate the commonplace became institutionalized 
under Romanticism.18 Whereas antiquity regarded genius as evidence of 
divine involvement in human affairs, Romanticism stressed instead the 
“idea of man transcending himself”: the ability of the artist’s imagination 
to reach beyond immediate material circumstances and limitations to ar-
rive at otherwise undetectable beauty, meaning, or sentiment amid the 
commonplace.19
 This depiction of the genius as unconstrained by empirical limitations 
was quickly recognized as innately problematic to the enterprise of history. 
stokes  Essays
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By the 1790s Immanuel Kant constituted genius in the Critique	of	Judgment 
as aptitude with unknown origins, which “no science can teach and that 
cannot be learned by any diligence.”20 For some European critics of the 
nineteenth century, genius exposed a flaw in literary history, and detractors 
such as turn-of-the-century French critic Emile Faguet argued that “histori-
cal contextualism” could “explain everything except what, perhaps, one 
most wants to explain—‘genius.’”21 In 1863 French critic Edmund Scherer 
wrote in a review of Hippolyte Taine’s history of English literature that 
history has “been at all times conceived to be . . . a narrative. Its purpose 
is to make the actions of men known to inquirers into the causes of these 
actions, because that is a means of producing a better understanding of 
them. But its researches are limited to those causes which are a matter of 
documentary evidence. There history stops.” “A man’s genius,” Scherer 
wrote, “is a fact which we are powerless to explain, which we must accept 
without attempting to determine its laws.”22 As Drummond Bone puts it, 
genius is “a kind of aporia. It refers to . . . [that] which escapes the very 
categories of comprehension and of speech.”23 As such, the genius defies 
the mission of literary history of situating writers within historical context 
and within a chronology of achievement, for the ahistorical nature of such 
works of genius renders context an impotent source of explication. All of 
this led to the suggestion that empiricist methods and fact-finding might be 
leading literary history to a dead end, for they apparently couldn’t deliver 
the ne	plus	ultra of literary historical scholarship: the sources of literary 
achievement and inspiration.
 This historiographical debate never took hold in American literary his-
torical discourse the way it had in Europe because Howells effectively sand-
bagged it by intimating in his 1886 review that no serious modern person 
could believe in such a thing. Howells countered the attributions of genius 
in Poets	of	America	with an alternate interpretation of the inexplicability of 
genius; rather than signaling the failure of literary history, as these other 
critics had suggested, its defiance of positivist research technique evidences 
instead its nonexistence. If it can’t be tracked, explained, and analyzed, 
then it can’t definitively be said to exist at all. Howells asked with incredulity, 
“do [the defenders of genius] really believe it? Can they severally lay their 
hands upon their waistcoats and swear that they think there is any such 
thing?”24 He emphasized this point to suggest that a “superstition” devoid of 
factual corroboration other than the fervent guarantees of a few idealists is 
no foundation on which to build a work of literary historical scholarship.25 
After all, we don’t expect geographers or oceanographers to attribute natu-
ral and scientific phenomena to such marvels as the Maelstrom because 
“[t]here is no Maelstrom sucking down ships and vomiting up bottles with 
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MSS. in them; there is only a bad current off the coast of Norway.”26 That 
is, we expect scientific works of scholarship to draw rational explanations 
from verifiable data, and, in comparing genius to the Maelstrom, Howells 
implies that we should no expect no less from works of literary scholarship. 
He here pits idealist imaginative fancy against the unsentimentality of real-
ist fact-gathering to suggest that literary history is no place for the idealist 
aesthetic, which, as he characterizes it, privileges the aesthetically pleasing 
over the factually accurate and threatens to transform literary history into 
a repository for fantasy, rumor, and unsubstantiated theory. In a cutting 
aside on the damaging effects of idealism on literary history, Howells asked, 
“What won’t a man sacrifice to a theory, especially a wrong one?”27
 Howells’ review argues that “great men”—Stedman’s geniuses—are no 
less the products of observable historical circumstance than the rest of us, 
and Howells directly challenged idealist epistemology by offering a vision 
of a world made intelligible through realist methods. One need only be 
sensible and observant enough to discern the meaningful details that ex-
plain one’s character and work. He remarked,
as we come to know great men better, we come to see that, after all, they are 
of one blood with the well-known human race, and no miracles of creation. 
They seem each thoroughly of his time and place, and this or that tendency 
of civilization appears to have found its most striking expression in them. Na-
poleon was the creature of the French Revolution, as Grant was the creature 
of our civil war.28
“Great men” are rooted in the specifics of their time periods, and Howells 
insists that it is the responsibility of the historian to relay the circumstances 
of their development and achievement, a task that he models with a discus-
sion of Ulysses S. Grant’s recently published Memoir. “All the conditions 
[of Grant’s life] are favorable to supposing a case of ‘genius,’” Howells 
wrote, and yet he systematically debunks this claim by relating some of 
the more verifiable contexts of the general’s achievements that belie such 
an attribution: West Point, his father’s encouragement, his patriotism, as 
well as a “plain, taciturn, simple, unaffected soul.”29 Achievement, Howells 
aims to show, can be regarded in context, and so critics therefore ought to 
limit themselves to the discussion of certainties, such as the material and 
historical contexts by which such men were able to cultivate their “natural 
aptitude” through “the hardest study.”30 Ultimately, Howells’ review argued 
that acceptable literary history was discernible by its adherence to the realist 
worldview and that the belief in genius was at best the misguided fancy of 
idealistic dreamers and at worst a scholarly short-cut in the place of pains-
taking research into a writer’s life.
stokes  Essays
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 In putting Stedman on the defensive, Howells made him the apologist for 
these enduring historiographical questions, and Stedman championed his 
cause as best he could, responding several months later with the publication 
of the lengthy essay “Genius” in the New	Princeton	Review. Stedman faced a 
serious problem in defending his beleaguered positions, for how can one 
credibly use such argumentative, logical tools as facts, material history, and 
context to argue against their use? It is a truism that the master’s tools will 
never dismantle the master’s house, but Stedman certainly tried to use the 
empiricist tools and techniques he critiqued to defend his belief in genius 
as the unreachable frontier of historical exegesis. His retort is composed 
chiefly of excerpts and corroborating opinions from major thinkers across 
Western history—among them the Platonists, Dryden, Carlyle, and James 
Russell Lowell—endorsing the existence of supra-mortal abilities that defy 
explanation or reason. In this way, Stedman paradoxically relied almost 
exclusively on historical evidence and precedent to justify his belief in the 
limits of historical knowledge. Indeed, in his review, Howells had made the 
obverse move, rejecting historical convention as insufficient explanation 
for rejecting historical knowledge; that people had always believed such a 
thing didn’t justify continuing to believe in such questionable phenomena 
as the Maelstrom or genius.
 That Stedman turned toward history to defend his belief in the limits of 
historical knowledge is evident in the Library	of	American	Literature (1888–
90), the eleven-volume anthology Stedman co-edited with Ellen Mackay 
Hutchinson. Spanning American literature from 1607 through 1888, the 
Library plays a central role in the history of American literary study and of 
the discipline of American literary history; though seldom cited today and 
largely unknown even by specialists of late-century American literature, 
it was nonetheless the nation’s first far-reaching anthology of American 
literature, widely consulted and cited by generations of American literary 
scholars and historians well into the mid-twentieth century. By the time of 
Howells’ review in 1886, Stedman has already begun work on the Library, 
and it is clear that Stedman used the anthology to respond to Howells’ 
review by anthologizing excerpts from texts that also corroborated a belief 
in genius and the limits of material, historical knowledge. The contents of 
this massive anthology warrant their own considered analysis, but even a 
cursory glance at the tables of contents (all eleven of them) reveal that the 
editors had paid clear homage to their loyalties and professional allegiances. 
For example, the anthology paid particular attention to Hutchinson’s place 
of employment, the	New	York	Tribune, and anthologized the work of many 
of her colleagues, among them Isaac Hill Bromley, George Washington 
Smalley, William Winter, and Whitelaw Reid.
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 The fingerprint of Stedman’s scrap with Howells is apparent in the wealth 
of reprinted excerpts from numerous texts designed to defend Stedman’s 
belief in genius and the limits of historical knowledge. Volume nine of the 
anthology, for example, included the work of Junius Henri Browne, a writer 
for the	Tribune. A well-regarded critic and journalist, Browne was best known 
for his memoir Four	Years	in	Secessia (1865),which recounted his experiences 
as a correspondent during the Civil War, his capture at Vicksburg, lengthy 
imprisonment in a Confederate prison, and escape northward. However, the 
editors chose not to reprint an excerpt from this memoir of national impor-
tance and instead anthologized an obscure 1878 essay entitled “Genius and 
Labor” originally published in Appleton’s	Journal. Though of minimal wider 
significance, the essay both lent support to Stedman’s embattled position 
on genius and neatly addressed many of the objections raised by Howells. 
It directly countered, for example, Howells’ contention that literary genius 
downplayed authorial labor, for Stedman edited the excerpt to begin with 
the observation that “[t]here are two distinctive kinds of genius, although 
there is but one kind of labor. There is the genius which is patient, toilsome, 
persevering, which accomplishes something, which becomes known. There 
is also the genius which is careless [and] indolent.”31
 Other examples abound in the literary history. Volume seven included an 
excerpt from Rufus Griswold’s infamous biography of Poe, though the edi-
tors tailored the selection both to make a case for the literary value of Poe, 
who was often dismissed by late-century critics who found his personal life 
repellant, and to substantiate Stedman’s stance on genius, for their selec-
tion reprinted only Griswold’s discussion of Poe’s “supramortal” abilities, 
his channeling of the divine and otherworldly into his work.32 The editors 
took some liberty in titling this excerpted selection “The Genius and Char-
acter of Poe,” a maneuver designed to validate Stedman’s belief that true 
literary greatness required freedom from the constraints of daily life and 
imaginative communion with otherworldly powers. Similarly, volume seven 
anthologized the work of Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise, one of the founders of 
American Reform Judaism. One might expect the anthology to anthologize 
perhaps some of Wise’s more important theological writings or excerpts 
from the Union Prayer Book of the Reform movement. But they instead 
excerpted selections from his book The	Cosmic	God (1876), which they titled 
“An Hebraic View of Genius.” The selection is obviously edited to lend 
religious weight to the concept of genius and uses the imprimatur of the 
Hebrew Bible to legitimize Stedman’s recorded position: “The existence of 
genius and its appearance at the right place and time is as mysterious as the 
centre of the universe. Genius is the superior spontaneity of the mind in 
productive and executive powers. It conceives, not by an act of volition or 
stokes  Essays
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tiresome reflection, but freely, generously, and unsolicited. . . . The ancient 
Hebrews called it Ruach	hak-kodesh, a ‘holy spirit,’ and modern language 
names it Genius.”33
 Similarly, the Library directly challenged Howells’ dismissive remarks 
about poetry. The final three volumes of the anthology, which cover the 
years between 1861 and 1888, are positively overwhelmed by American po-
etry, with literally hundreds upon hundreds of pages allotted to verse. The 
density of poetry, as well as the widely varying quality of excerpted poetry, 
suggests that the editors had simply combed the pages of magazines and 
periodicals from those decades to find examples of poetry in a clear effort 
to affirm the continuing viability and prosperity of American poetry. The 
impetus to demonstrate the enduring vitality of poetry was so great that 
the editors made a series of noteworthy decisions, such as their inclusion 
of African American spirituals and songs, selections that, splayed out on 
the inert printed page, evidence thriving home-spun folk poetry. Volume 
eleven similarly included a section of thirty pages entitled “Various Poems,” 
which reprinted single poems by such figures as abolitionist William Lloyd 
Garrison and journalist Charles Henry Crandall, plus a few anonymously 
written poems. The editors even anthologized the verse of their lawyer, 
Charles Henry Phelps. And in an especially strong gesture, the anthology 
reprinted several poems by Howells himself as a reminder of his earlier 
generic loyalties and aspirations.
 Likewise, in a gesture of aesthetic revenge, these volumes significantly 
downplayed realist fiction of the post-war period. For instance, the first two 
hundred pages of volume ten, which covers the 1870s and 80s, anthologized 
fifty-five writers. Out of those fifty-five writers, only five were writers of realist 
fiction whose excerpts included realist texts.34 The remainder of these first 
two hundred pages of the volume is composed of a combination of poetry 
and non-fiction: varied historical writings, political and economic writings, 
literary criticism, and philosophy. Moreover, the selections devoted to these 
five fiction writers were designed to downplay their fiction and to showcase 
their contributions to other genres: for example, the pages devoted to 
Henry James emphasized his non-fiction writings, and the pages devoted 
to both Bret Harte and George Alfred Townsend reprinted some of their 
poems, an inclusion that pointedly demonstrates that the rising popularity 
of fiction need not necessarily entail the demise of poetry.
 Despite Stedman’s efforts to make a compelling case for his aesthetic 
and generic loyalties, there is no doubt that Howells’ opinion carried the 
day. While Stedman had the media of literary history and anthologies on 
his side, Howells had the more powerful venue of his Harper’s columns. 
Though a few idealist critics such as Columbia professor George Edward 
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Woodberry sided with Stedman and incorporated idealist aesthetics into 
their works of literary history, the vast majority of turn-of-the-century liter-
ary historians employed methods that affirmed the powers of historical 
knowledge and corroborated Howells’ empiricist beliefs. While the prolif-
eration of Howells’ methods in the short-term may be due in part to the 
minor publicity sensation caused by this quarrel and the damaging public 
consequences of diverging from his opinions about the methods and mis-
sion of American literary history, Howells’ lasting victory may also be due 
to the fact that he more effectively controlled the discourse, framing the 
issue with rhetoric that made his positions irresistible. Defining genius as 
the hallmark of inborn greatness, Howells characterized it as essentially 
un-American and undemocratic. Genius, Howells remarked, is “a doctrine 
wholly opposed to the spirit of free institutions and the principles of civil 
service reform.”35 Howells interpreted genius as a signifier of aristocratic 
sympathy both because of its apparent celebration of innate superiority 
and because of its seeming incongruity with the late-century spirit of liter-
ary self-fashioning that had enabled so many writers of lowly pedigree and 
little formal education—such as Hamlin Garland, Mark Twain, and Howells 
himself—to assume places of national prominence. This interpretation was 
fortified by Stedman’s depiction of authorship as a purely passive activity 
made possible by inborn gifts, a characterization that freely accessed linger-
ing American perceptions of authorship as an indolent, leisured avocation 
of a privileged few and one that Howells attempted to dismantle throughout 
his life by depicting writing as arduous labor.
 The self-educated and class-conscious son of an erratically-employed lower-
middle-class printer, Howells remained sensitive throughout his life to the 
whiff of such literary aristocratic sensibilities, whether in the American belief 
in authorship as an aristocratic prerogative or in the patrician pretensions 
of fellow writers.36 Howellsian realism may certainly be understood as an 
aesthetic expression of this lifelong class sensitivity, as with his repeated calls 
for American writers to cease peddling literary fantasies of the aristocracy 
modeled after Walter Scott’s Waverley novels and adopt instead common, 
plebian life as their source of literary inspiration. Howells’ realist aesthetic 
aimed to overturn literary class hierarchies by replacing literary fantasies 
about the already-powerful with celebrations of the commonplace and lowly. 
Howells responded as violently as he did to Stedman’s literary history in part 
because it hinted of an attempt to topple this democratic sensibility and re-
store authorship to the prerogative of a leisured few. In liberally bestowing 
literary laurels of the most grandiose and daunting kind, Stedman seemed to 
constitute the American literary past so as, by contrast, to diminish the literary 
present and to foreclose a literary future peopled by a more economically 
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and geographically diverse population. As dramatized in Howells’ fantasy 
of “trembling” “poor little authorlings . . . in question of whether they have 
[genius], or have only ‘talent,” the elevation of some writers above human 
heights, according to Howells, promised to make literary achievement seem 
even more supernal and unattainable than usual and therefore to remove it 
altogether from the reach of the literally poor.37
 And so Howells took pains in his review to reinstate his own classed vi-
sion of authorship as a demanding form of labor available to anyone with 
some skill and a strong work ethic, and to level the literary playing field by 
constituting success as chiefly dependent upon the writer’s own toil. In the 
place of genius, he wrote, “there is only the mastery that comes to natural 
aptitude from the hardest study of any art or science.”38 In this way, Howells 
attempted to rewrite the American literary past from Stedman’s intimidat-
ing, idealized pantheon of inborn greatness to a more realism-informed 
paradigm of self-determination and diligence that he thereby channeled 
into a vision of an equally labor-intensive method of literary history. With 
the debate formulated thus, American literary historians had no choice 
but to reject idealist methods that had been summarized so convincingly 
as aristocratic in nature and to adopt instead empiricist methods that an-
nounced themselves as based in such middle-class values as self-reliance 
and industry.
 Characterized in this fashion by Howells and left to languish as a fringe 
literary historical methodology that failed to catch on, Stedman’s idealist 
practices are nonetheless important in a historiography of the field, for it 
once entertained practices that freely acknowledged the limitations of real-
ist research methods and embraced the imagination as a legitimate source 
of scholarly inquiry. The recent rise of a generation of scholars willing 
to question the methods Howells endorsed suggests that the disciplinary 
pendulum swing may finally be moving toward greater sympathy to Sted-
man’s ideas. Numerous important literary historians and editors of major 
national literary histories—among them R. Howard Bloch, Emory Elliott, 
Denis Hollier, Linda Hutcheon, David Perkins, and David Wellbery—have 
examined how realist literary history can fall prey to overweening certainty, 
the illusion of critical consensus, and historical incompleteness. This last 
consequence is due to the expectation that the literary historian “suppress 
whatever perceptions do not fit with his plot construction,” a requirement 
that may lead, as it had with Howells in 1886, to the excision of unresolved 
debates and questions.39 In his preface to the Columbia	Literary	History	of	the	
United	States (1988), Elliott explained his skepticism about the historical 
concreteness demanded by Howells and disdained by Stedman, thereby 
voicing some of the chief complaints about this realist form:
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This work [the Columbia	Literary	History	of	the	United	States] does not . . . consti-
tute a new consensus about the history of the literature of the United States. 
For many reasons . . . concurrence remains impossible at this time. There 
is today no unifying vision of a national identity like that shared by many 
scholars at the closing of the two world wars. We have therefore sought to 
represent the variety of viewpoints that enliven current scholarship [with] 
. . . individual essays.40
Linda Hutcheon raised similar objections in her complaint that “the earlier 
model of literary history stubbornly persists, not so much in the form of a 
simple explanatory or causal narrative (though it too continues), but, more 
obviously, in a teleological narrative of continual and organic evolution.”41 
For both Elliott and Hutcheon, the insistence on causal explanation and 
narrative coherence in literary history only compromises the scholarly in-
tegrity it seeks to fortify. Recent monumental works of literary history as 
the New	History	of	French	Literature (1989) and New	History	of	German	Litera-
ture (2004) employ a wide range of experimental forms and techniques 
designed to evade the unifying certainty and explanatory diachrony man-
dated by realist literary historical technique. In addition, recent works of 
literary biography—such as Andrew Delbanco’s Melville:	His	World	and	Work	
(2005) and Colm Tóibín’s The	Master	(2004)—freely draw on the literary 
imagination critiqued by Howells and endorsed by Stedman, a gesture that 
challenges the realist emphasis on empirical data. As suggested by all these 
recent developments, literary history may finally be sympathetic to some 
of the positions Stedman fervently espoused.
—Trinity University
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